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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

J. Rodney Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills,
trusts, and estates that added, amended, or repealed a number
of sections of the Code of Virginia in the 1996 and 1997 sessions. In addition, there were eleven Supreme Court of Virginia
opinions in the two-year period ending April 18, 1997, that involved issues of interest to the general practitioner as well as
the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article reports
on all of these legislative and judicial developments. 1
II. 1996 LEGISLATION

A Nonresident Fiduciaries-Prohibitions Eliminated
Virginia's policy regarding a nonresident individual2 serving
as a sole fiduciary for an estate, testamentary trust, or an incapacitated person has evolved from a pre-1983 xenophobia to a
1996 open door policy in a series of legislative enactments3
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1965, College
of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Vrrginia sections,
they will often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only.
2. The prohibition against a foreign corporation serving as a fiduciary continues
in existence. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
3. For the history of this movement as it relates to: (i) personal representatives,
testamentary trustees, and guardians, committees and trustees of incompetent or
incapacitated persons, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills,
Trusts and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1175, 1182-85 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Annual Survey]; (ii) guardians of the person of infants, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 859, 860
(1989); and (iii) trustees of inter vivos trusts receiving pour-overs from wills, see J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates 25 U.
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culminating in the 1996 amendments to sections 26-59 and
64.1-73.4 The privilege extended to nonresidents is, however,
subject to certain qualifications as follows:
(1) Personal Representative, Testamentary Trustee, Guardian
of an Infant's Estate, Guardian of the Person or Property of an
Incapacitated Person, and Committee of a Person Non Compos
Mentis. As amended, subsection A of section 26-59 now provides
that any nonresident individual may serve as sole fiduciary in
any of the listed capacities if the fiduciary (i) consents to service of process in matters related to the fiduciary office being
made either on a person designated by the fiduciary or on the
clerk of court in which the fiduciary qualified, and (ii) posts
bond with surety, unless surety is waived by the court pursuant
to section 26-4.5

(2) Guardian of the Person of an Infant. The 1989 provision
repealing the residency requirement applicable to a guardian of
the person of an infant6 is continued in the 1996 legislation
with a slightly different citation. 7
(3) Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust Receiving a Pour-Over
from a Will. Whereas traditional estate planning has been willbased, a number of today's estate planners favor a plan based
upon an inter vivos trust in some instances. In these inter
vivos trust-based plans, the desire to integrate all of the client's

RICH. L. REv. 925, 930 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Annual Suruey].
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Rep!. Vol. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73 (Cum.
Supp. 1997).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Section 26-4 allows the court and
its clerk to waive surety in cases involving personal representatives, guardians, and
committees [but makes no reference to testamentary trustees] when the amount under the control of the fiduciary does not exceed $5000. Id. § 26-4 (Rep!. Vol. 1997).
Other than this exception, however, section 26-59(A) clearly provides that surety must
be given, "[n]otwithstanding §§ 37.1-135 [which allows the court to waive surety upon
the official bonds of committees for incompetent persons, guardians for incapacitated
persons, and trustees for incompetent ex-service persons] and 64.1-121 [which
eliminates the need for surety upon the official bonds of personal representatives of a
decedent's estate in certain cases]." Id. § 26-59(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Note that neither
of the references in the preceding sentence includes a trustee of a testamentary trust.
This omission, however, should not present a problem because the section authorizing
clerks to appoint and qualify testamentary trustees calls for them to act "pursuant to
the provisions of§ 26-59." Id. § 26-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
6. See Act of March 23, 1989, ch. 535, 1989 Va. Acts 787 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-59(D) (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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assets into one vehicle following the client's death is accomplished by making a testamentary pour-over gift of the net
residue of the client's probate estate to the inter vivos trust. In
order to close an obvious loophole, section 64.1-73 has imposed
residency requirements on the trustee of an inter vivos trust
receiving such a pour-over that were, from time to time, similar
to those imposed on a trustee of a testamentary trust by section 26-59. Thus, the 1996 amendments to section 64.1-73 follow the pattern of those made to section 26-59, described above,
with the result that any nonresident individual may serve as
sole trustee of an inter vivos trust receiving a testamentary
pour-over if the trustee (i) consents to service of process in
trust-related matters being made either on a person designated
by the trustee or on the clerk of court in which the trustee
qualified, and (ii) posts bond with surety unless surety is
waived by the court pursuant to section 26-4.s The surety-related problems that were noted in these pages following the 1991
amendments to this section have not yet been addressed and
thus remain unresolved.9

8. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-73(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997). Section 26-4 allows the court
and its clerk to waive surety in cases involving personal representatives, guardians,
and committees when the amount under the control of the fiduciary does not exceed
$5000. This section, however, makes no reference to trustees of an inter vivos trust.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-4 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
9. See Johnson, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 930 which reads as follows:
One question left unanswered by the new amendment is whether
the amount of the bond and surety must correspond to the value of the
entire inter vivos trust, or only to the testamentary addition thereto.
From both a logical and a policy analysis it would appear that the latter
possibility is the correct answer. A second unanswered question is what
mechanism, if any, insures the continuing sufficiency of this bond and
surety? This question is not so easily answered. In the case of a testamentary trustee, section 26-2 of the Code requires the commissioner of
accounts to examine the sufficiency of the bond and surety of a testamentary trustee as a part of the commissioner's inspection of the testamentary trustee's annual accounting. However, as the trustee of an inter
vivos trust is not required to make such an accounting, and as section
64.l-73(dXl) of the Code provides that a testamentary pour over to such
a trust "shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the
testator," there appears to be no procedure under existing law to insure
the continuing sufficiency of the bond and surety.
Johnson, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 930.
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B. Trust Termination-Settlor's Intent

Section 55-19.4, entitled, "Petition for reformation of a trust,"
was added to the Code in 1991.10 A concern quickly developed
that this section's exceptionally liberal trust termination procedure could "be used to destroy much of what estate planning is
all about ... [and might mean that] the prudent Virginia attorney will be forced to create trusts under the laws of other jurisdictions in order to insure that a client's legitimate purposes
will not be frustrated." 11 An article published in 1995 spelled
out the deficiencies of section 55-19.4 in detail and suggested
mandatory language for their correction. 12 These suggested
changes were enacted, mutatis mutandis, by the 1996 session.13
C. Durable Powers of Attorney-Judicial Discovery

The 1995 Session enacted far reaching reform measures relating to non-judicial accountings14 and judicial discovery15 in
connection with durable powers of attorney. 16 The judicial discovery provision was amended in 1996 to require that a request
for disclosure pursuant to the non-judicial accounting procedure
must be made before the judicial discovery remedy is available.
The 1996 amendment also restrictively clarifies the definition of
the phrase "person interested in the welfare of a principal," by
changing the operative verb from "includes" [certain persons] to

10. Act of March 20, 1991, ch. 415, 1991 Va. Acts 621 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-19.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
11. Johnson, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 932-33.
12. See J. Rodney Johnson, Trustor's Intent in Termination Cases: An Endangered
Species in Virginia--i1r Extinct?, VA. ST. B. TR. AND EST. NEWSL. Fall 1995, at 3.
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
14. See Act of March 18, 1995, ch. 369, 1995 Va. Acts 522 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-9.6 (Cum. Supp. 1997)).
15. See id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-132.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997)).
16. See generally Johnson, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1175-79 (discussing the relevant 1995 legislation).
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"is" [those same persons], and slightly enlarges this class by
including "niece or nephew" therein. 17

D. Joint Bank 18 Accounts-Financial Exploitation-Remedy
The concern for certain victims of financial exploitation expressed by the 1994 Session,19 which led to the 1995 enactment of the durable power of attorney reforms mentioned in the
preceding paragraph of this article,20 resulted in further recommendations being made to the 1996 Session by House Document No. 24.21 One of these recommendations focused on the
ubiquitous joint bank account which, because of its survivorship
feature, the Supreme Court of Virginia once referred to as "the
poor man's will."22 Another feature of a joint bank account is
the. opportunity it presents for a sole depositor to insure continuing access to the depositor's funds by adding a trusted
person's name to the account who will be able to access the
depositor's funds for the depositor's convenience during times of
illness, etc. Accordingly, House Document No. 24 further recognizes that "[t]o a certain extent, very familiar to those who
work with persons of modest means, the joint account might
also be referred to as 'the poor man's durable power of attorney.m23 Not only does this de facto durable power of attorney
present the same opportunities for financial exploitation as a de
jure power, House Document No. 24 reports that "more cases of
financial exploitation of the elderly occur through the abuse of
a joint account than through a [formal] power of attorney."24
To provide relief in these joint account cases, the General
Assembly accepted the specific recommendation of House Docu17. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-132.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
18. Although the text will refer to "bank" accounts for purposes of convenience,
the legislation and the following discussion is applicable to joint accounts in any
"financial institution" as that term is defined in VA. CODE .ANN. § 6.1-125.1(3) (Rep!.
Vol. 1993).
19. See H.J. Res. 84, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1994).
20. See generally Johnson, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1175-79.
21. See REPORT OF THE VmGINIA BAR AssOCIATION ON CML REMEDIES TO ENHANCE PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE ADULTS FROM FINANCIAL ExPLOITATION, H. Doc.
No. 24 (1996) [hereinafter H. Doc. No. 24].
22. King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 849, 86 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1955).
23. H. Doc. No. 24, supra note 21, at 4.
24. Id.
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ment No. 24 that the non-judicial accounting and the judicial
discovery remedies enacted in 1995 vis-a-vis the standard durable power of attorney be extended to joint bank accounts. The
General Assembly accepted this recommendation by adding new
section 6.1-125.15:1 to the Virginia Code, which recognizes that:
(i) "[p]arties to a joint account in a financial institution occupy
the relation of principal and agent as to each other, with each
standing as a principal in regard to his ownership interest in
the joint account25 and as agent in regard to the ownership
interest of the other party";26 and (ii) "[t]he provisions of §§
11-9.6 [non-judicial accounting] and 37.1-132.1 [judicial discovery] shall apply to such principal agent relationships."27

E. lnfiationary Adjustments
Over the years, the General Assembly has enacted numerous
probate related statutes that contain references to specific dollar amounts. It is the destiny of any such statute to decline in
significance as inflation decreases the actual value of the specified amount. Responding to this problem, the 1996 Session
increased the amounts in a number of these statutes as follows:
(1) Probate Avoidance-Small Estates. The Virginia Code
contains a number of statutes designed to facilitate the transfer
of specific kinds of property from the dead to the living without
requiring the recipients to go through the probate process.
These statutes are permissive in nature and, although they
fully protect the transferor who elects to rely upon them, a
potential transferee cannot force their use. A further common
denominator in most of these statutes has been a requirement

25. Notwithstanding the popular misconception that a joint bank account is a
joint tenancy with the parties thereto owning the deposit equally, the Vrrginia Code
provides that "[a] joint account belongs, during the lifetimes of all parties, to the
parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on deposit, except
that a joint account between persons married to each other shall belong to them
equally, and unless, in either case, there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.l-125.3(A) (Rep!. Vol. 1993).
26. Id. § 6.1-125.15(1) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
27. Id. Section 6.1-125.15(1) concludes by providing that "[fJor the purposes of this
section, the definition of a joint account in a financial institution, and the ownership
interest of the parties therein, are determined in accordance with the provisions of
this Chapter [Chapter 2.1 of Title 6.1]." Id.
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that the value of the property in question not exceed $5,000.
This ceiling has been increased to $10,000 in the following
instances: (i) certain sums due decedents from the Commonwealth, the United States, labor unions or employers;28 (ii) corporate securities owned by the decedent; 29 (iii) sums due deceased trust or estate beneficiaries;30 (iv) sums due a "deceased
inmate of state mental institution";31 (v) sums due a "deceased
patient of municipally operated health care facility"; 32 and (vi)
"personal property belonging to nonresident decedents."33
(2) Small Estates Act. The Virginia Small Estate Act has
provided for an affidavit-based personal property collection
process in estates where the value of the entire personal probate estate does not exceed $5000.34 The 1996 legislation increased this ceiling to $10000.35

(3) Exempt Property and Living Allowance. The 1981 Session
enacted comprehensive legislation governing the rights of a
decedent's spouse and children to exempt property and allowances.36 The 1996 amendments increased the exempt property
allowance from $3500 to $10,000,37 and also increased the
personal representative's authority to award a living allowance
from $6000 to $12,000 if payment is made as a lump sum, and
from $500 to $1000 monthly for one year if payment is made
on a periodic basis.38 It should be noted that these living allowance amounts are not limitations upon the entitlement

28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
29. See id. § 64.1-123.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
30. See id. § 64.1-123.3 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
31. Id. § 64.1-124 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
32. Id. § 64.1-124.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
33. Id. § 64.1-130 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
34. See §§ 64.1-132.1 to -132.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995). For a discussion of this Act, see
J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA. L. REv. 521, 529-30 (1982).
35. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
36. See Act of March 22, 1981, ch. 580, 1981 Va. Acts 897 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.1-151.1 to -151.6 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). For a discussion of this Act and its
background, see J. Rodney Johnson, Support of the Suruiving Spouse and Minor Children in Virginia: Proposed Legislation v. Present La.w, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 639
(1980), and Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, supra note 34, at 521-25.
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
38. See id. § 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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amount, which remains a "reasonable allowance,"39 but only a
limitation upon what can be disbursed without court approval.40
(4) Spendthrift Trusts. The $500,000 ceiling on spendthrift
trusts that was established in 198041 has been increased to
$600,000.42

Abatement-Funeral Expenses. When a decedent's probate
personal property is not sufficient to pay all claims against the
decedent's estate, section 64.1-157 establishes an eight-step
order of priority in which they must be satisfied which, in some
cases, also includes a limitation on the amount of a claim's
priority.43 Funeral expenses remain in step three under the
1996 legislation, but their priority amount increases from $500
to $2000.44
(5)

F. Will Contest-Nonresident-Limitation Period
The general limitation period on bringing a plenary proceeding in circuit court to impeach or establish a will that has been
admitted to, or denied, probate in an ex parte proceeding before
the court or its clerk is one year from the time the order or
decree was entered.45 Section 64.1-90, however, provides for
exten!3ions of this one-year period to certain categories of persons.46 The 1996 amendment to this section eliminates the provision establishing a two-year period for persons who reside
outside the Commonwealth at the time the initial order or
decree is entered in the ex parte proceedings, and thereby puts
nonresidents on the same footing as residents.47

39. Id. § 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
40. See id. § 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
41. See Act of March 22, 1980, ch. 267, 1980 Va. Acts 288.
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-157 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
44. See id.
45. See id. § 64.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
46. See id. § 64.1-90 (Cum. Supp. 1997). Those who were entitled to an enlarged
period before the 1996 amendment were minors, incapacitated persons, nonresidents
who have made no personal appearance, and persons who "have been proceeded
against by order of publication" who have made no personal appearance. Id. § 64.1-90
(Repl. Vol. 1995).
47. See id. § 64.1-90 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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G. Personal Representative's Bond-Reduction
In the typical ex parte probate proceeding, the clerk of court
sets the amount of the personal representative's bond based
upon the personal representative's estimate of the value of the
decedent's estate under the personal representative's control.
Although the Virginia Code contains a provision for increasing
the amount of this bond at a later date if it is found to be
insufficient,48 there has been no corresponding provision providing for a reduction thereof if the bond is later found to be
too large, whether as an original proposition or due to changing
facts. The 1996 legislation now requires the clerk to redetermine the amount of a personal representative's bond, upon the
personal representative's request, following a reduction of the
estate's value that occurs because of disbursements, distributions, or valuation of assets.49 The authorized bond reductions
are limited to bonds initially set by the clerk, as opposed to the
court, and the claimed reduction in value must be supported by
a commissioner approved inventory or a court confirmed accounting.50
H. Personal Representative's Bond-Surety

Section 64.1-121 eliminates the requirement of a surety upon
the bonds of executors and administrators if they (or a portion
of them) take the entirety of a decedent's estate.51 The 1996
amendment extends the spirit of this rule to include cases
where the executors (or a portion of them) take the entirety of
a decedent's residuary estate. Although the executor's bond will
still be based upon the value of the decedent's estate under the
executor's control, surety will now have to be given only on that
portion of the bond that corresponds to the portion of the

48.
49.
50.
51.
where
1997).

See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-120 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
See id.
See id. § 64.1-121 (Cum. Supp. 1997). This waiver does not extend to cases
all of the fiduciaries are nonresidents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Repl. Vol.
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decedent's estate that is passing to the non-executor beneficiaries.52

I. Personal Representative-No Incumbent
The general rule of section 64.1-131 provides that if a twomonth period elapses without a personal representative in office, the court or clerk "shall, on the motion of any person,
order any person of the county or city" to serve as personal
representative.53 The 1996 amendment to this section provides
that "any sheriff so ordered may decline the appointment if the
appointment interferes with his current duties or obligations."54

J. Presumption of Death-Disappearance
Section 64.1-105 of the Virginia Code, dealing with the presumed death of a person who has not been heard from for a
period of seven years, requires an unnecessarily long wait in
some instances where it is reasonable to assume that one has
in fact died at an earlier time. 55 Thus, this section was amended in 1996 to cover one such case by providing that a person
who
disappears in a foreign country, whose body has not been
found and who is not known to be alive, upon issuance of a
report of presumptive death by the Department of State of
the United States following an investigation by a competent
local authority, shall be presumed to be dead. 56

This legislation, which is specifically applicable to State Department certificates issued before or after its effective date,57 was

52. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-121 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
53. Id. § 64.1-131 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Exceptions are made for those cases where
the vacancy in office is due to a will contest, the infancy of the executor, and the
absence of the executor. See id.
54. Id. § 64.1-131 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
55. See id. § 64.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
56. Id. § 64.1-105 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Conforming amendments
are also made to Virginia Code §§ 26-68.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997), 64.1-106 to -110, -112
(Cum. Supp. 1997).
57. See Act of April 6, 1996, ch. 675, 1996 Va. Acts 1168 (enacting S.B. 266, Va.
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enacted on an emergency basis, thus becoming effective on
April 6, 1996.58 The possible problem with this legislation relates to the emphasized language. Read literally, there are two
conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the presumption of death arises. They are (i) issuance of a State Department report, following (ii) an investigation by a competent local
authority. Query: how does the Virginia trial court determine
(a) the identity of "a competent local authority" in Libya, Iraq,
Haiti, etc., and (b) that this authority has conducted an investigation? It would appear that the statute would be made far
more effective by the deletion of the second condition precedent.
And, if this language does not represent an intended condition
precedent then a fortiori it should be deleted.
K

Clerk's Office-Recordation of Writings

Section 17-59 of the Virginia Code, which relates to "[e]very
writing authorized by law to be recorded," provides that the
clerk may refuse to record any document that fails to contain
certain information.59 The 1996 amendment adds to these informational requirements the fact that "the first page of the
document bears an entry showing the name of either the person
or entity who drafted the instrument."60 Although this section
is generally regarded as relating primarily to deeds of real
estate and related papers, its language refers to "[e]very writing
authorized by law to be recorded"61 and there is anecdotal evidence that some clerks are applying the new requirement to
powers of attorney.

Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)); Act of April 6, 1996, ch. 684, 1996 Va. Acts 1187
(enacting H.B. 424, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)).
58. See Act of April 6, 1996, ch. 675, 1996 Va. Acts 1168 (enacting S.B. 266, Va.
Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)); Act of April 16, 1996, ch. 684, 1996 Va. Acts 1187
(enacting H.B. 424, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-59 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
60. Id. The amendment contains an exception for writings prepared outside the
Commonwealth.
61. Id.
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L. Judicial Sale of Decedent's Realty-Proceeds

Section 64.1-184 of the Virginia Code deals with the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a decedent's real estate by the
special commissioner appointed to hold them, where the sale
occurs within one year of the decedent's death. 62 Prior to
amendment, this section has required the commissioner to hold
the proceeds for the remainder of the year in question before
making any distribution.63 The 1996 amendment authorizes
the commissioner to make an earlier distribution "upon the
posting of a bond with such surety as may be prescribed by the
court to secure any claims against the property or proceeds."64
M. Fiduciaries for Incapacitated Persons-Surety

Section 37.1-135 of the Virginia Code, dealing with judicial
appointment of guardians for incapacitated persons, committees
for incompetent persons, and trustees for incompetent ex-service
persons, has mandated that the court require surety upon the
fiduciary's official bond. 65 The 1996 amendment grants the
court discretion to waive this surety requirement.66
N. Charitable Gift Annuities

Section 38.2-106 defines the term "annuities" for all purposes
of Title 38 of the Virginia Code, the insurance title.67 The 1996
amendment to this section excludes from its definition "qualified charitable gift annuities as defined in § 38.2-106.1."68 Two
new sections provide, among others things, (i) a definition of a
charitable gift annuity,69 and (ii) that the issuance of qualified

62. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
63. See id.
64. Id. § 64.1-184 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-135 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-135 (Repl. Vol. 1996). Note that· this waiver provision will not be applicable if the only (or all of the) fiduciary is a nonresident. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-106 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
68. Id. § 38.2-106 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
69. See id. § 38.2-106.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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charitable annuities is not engaging in the business of insurance. 70 This legislation eliminates a problem for charitable organizations that had been utilizing charitable gift annuities as
a part of their fund raising operations.71

0. Conveyances of Virginia Realty by Foreign Executors
Section 64.1-149 has validated pre-June 30, 1960 conveyances
made by an executor under a will containing a power of sale
that was admitted to probate elsewhere, if the will is also probated in Virginia, even though the foreign executor did not also
qualify in Virginia. Section 64.1-150 has validated post-May 31,
1960 conveyances made under these same circumstances where,
in addition, a local ancillary administrator also executes the
deed in question. The 1996 amendments change the dates in
both of these statutes from 1960 to 1986.72
III. 1997 LEGISLATION EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1997
A. Assisted Conception-Mother's Husband as Donor

The 1991 Session passed legislation based on the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, which became
effective July 1, 1993.73 This legislation, which required significant estates-related clarification in the 1994 Session,74 was
further amended in 1997 to clarify that, notwithstanding the
general rule that a sperm donor is not the parent of a child
conceived by artificial conception, a donor married to the gestational mother is the father of the resulting child. 75

70. See id. § 38.2-3113.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
71. A portion of this enactment that will not be published in the Code reads as
follows: "That the provisions of this act, amending § 38.2-106, the definition of 'charitable gift; annuity' as added by this act in § 38.2-106.1, and subsections A and C in
§ 38.2-3113.2 as added by this act are declarative of existing law." Act of March 31,
1996, ch. 425, cl. 2, 1996 Va. Acts 717.
72. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-149, -150 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
73. Act of March 25, 1991, ch. 600, 1991 Va. Acts 1104-11.
74. For a discussion of the 1994 legislation, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1145-48 (1994).
75. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, -158(AX3) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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B. Succession-Illegitimacy-Exhumation

Section 64.1-5.1 of the Code contains the general rules governing the existence of a parent-child relationship for succession
purposes,76 and section 64.1-5.2 of the Code contains certain
evidentiary provisions that are applicable when the relationship
sought to be established is based upon a man being the illegitimate father of a child. 77 In addition to all relevant evidence,
this latter section specifically authorizes the introduction of
"medically reliable genetic blood grouping tests,"78 and "medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged parentage
of the child based on tests performed by experts."79 A 1996
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, however, held that
Virginia's exhumation statute80 "does not authorize an exhumation order for the purpose of establishing paternity."81 The
1997 Session amended the exhumation statute to provide that
the trial court may order disinterment in such cases "for the
conduct of scientifically reliable genetic tests, including blood
tests, to prove a biological relationship" if the moving party
presents substantial evidence that he will prevail under sections 64.1-5.1 and -5.2. 82 The importance of this amendment is
evidenced by the fact that "[i]n Virginia, approximately one out
of three children is born out of wedlock."83 And, even if a decedent leaves no estate or it goes to another, an illegitimate child
who is entitled to inherit under state law is also a child of the

76. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
77. Id. § 64.1-5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see generally J. Rodney Johnson, Inheritance
Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 275 (1978); Johnson, 1991 Annual
Survey, supra note 3, at 925-27 (discussing the background of sections 64.1-5.1 and
64.1-5.2).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2(7) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
79. Id. § 64.1-5.2(8) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
81. Garrett v. Majied, 252 Va. 46, 49, 471 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1996).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). The amendment further provides that "[t]he costs of exhumation and testing shall be paid by the moving party
unless, for good cause shown, the court orders such costs paid from the estate of the
exhumed deceased." Id.
83. Gary Robertson, Areas Join to Cut Illegitimacy While Vying for Federal Funds,
RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, July 15, 1997, at Bl. "And in some cities-Richmond (62 percent), Petersburg (69 percent) and Emporia (61 percent}-about two-thirds of the
births from 1991 to 1995 were illegitimate." Id.
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decedent for the purpose of Social Security survivor's benefi.ts.84
C. Accounts in Financial Institutions-Probate AvoidanceCeiling

Continuing the work initiated by the 1996 Session in making
inflationary adjustments to the Virginia Code's probate avoidance statutes,85 the 1997 Session increased the ceiling applicable to deposits in banks,86 savings and loan associations,87
and credit unions from $5000 to $10,000. 88
D. Nonresident Testamentary Trustee-Qualification

The 1996 Session amended section 26-59 of the Virginia Code
to allow a nonresident individual to serve as the sole trustee of
a testamentary trust.89 As no corresponding change was made,
however, to section 26-46.1 of the Virginia Code, dealing with
the clerk's appointive powers, such a nonresident could only
qualify before the court. The 1997 amendment eliminates this
problem by authorizing the clerk to qualify nonresident individuals as testamentary trustees in accordance with the provisions
of section 26-59.90

E. Principal and Income Act-Authorized Deviation
Virginia's version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act
provides, among other things, default rules for determining the
character of receipts and disbursements, i.e., whether they are

84. See 20 C.F.R §§ 404.350(aX1), 404.354(b) (1997).
B5. See discussion of the 1996 inflationary amendments to probate avoidance statutes supra Part !I.E.
B6. See VA. CODE .ANN. § 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
B7. See id. § 6.1-194.5B (Cum. Supp. 1997).
BB. See id. § 6.1-225.49 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
B9. See discussion supra Part II.A.
90. See VA. CODE .ANN. § 26-46.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). The referenced section (section 26-59) requires a nonresident individual serving as a sole fiduciary to post surety
on the fiduciary bond and to have a local agent for service of process. See id. § 26-59
(RepL VoL 1997).
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income or principal.91 Document drafters frequently give a fiduciary the discretion to make such allocations in a different
manner for several reasons. 92 The 1997 amendment provides
that making an allocation contrary to the default rules does not
raise a presumption of imprudence or impartiality if the governing document specifically grants an allocation power.93
F. Trusts-Lists of Tangible Personal Property
The 1995 Session enacted legislation authorizing a testator to
make gifts of tangible personal property after the will's execution by way of a writing or list not executed in accordance with
the formalities required for wills.94 In recognition of the growing popularity of the revocable inter vivos trust as a will substitute, 95 the 1997 Session extended the tangible personal property list concept to trusts. 96 Unlike the will provision, however,
which can dispose of any of the testator's tangible personal
property, the trust provision can only dispose of tangible personal property contained in the trust. 97 Although applicable
only to "revocable inter vivos" trusts when introduced, this
legislation was amended in committee by striking the words
"revocable inter vivos" from its opening sentence, thereby making it applicable to any trust. 98 Nevertheless, the prudent attorney will typically use this option only in connection with
revocable inter vivos trusts. The use of this option in connection
with an irrevocable trust will clearly be a reservation of power
to alter or amend the trust's disposition of its tangible personal

91. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-253 to -268 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
92. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-57(1Xi) (Repl. Vol. 1995) (creating a discretionary allocation power designed to be incorporated by reference into a will or trust).
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-254 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-45.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996); see also Johnson, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1185-86.
95. See J. Rodney Johnson, The Living Trust vs. The Will: Which is Best for the
Typical Virginian?, 42 VA. LAW., January 1994 at 37 (suggesting that this popularity
may not be deserved in the ordinary case).
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
97. See id.
98. See H.B. 2713, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997). The words "revocable
inter vivas," however, were not also deleted from the third sentence of the bill and
thus they were enacted as a part of section 55-7.2. Such an obvious oversight should
not create a problem Tor the courts construing this section in light of the legislative
history.
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property for federal estate tax purposes,99 and it may be construed to have a broader effect in creditors' rights cases.
G. Marital Deduction-Terminable Interest Rule

Federal estate tax law allows a deduction to the estate of a
married person for estate property that "passes or has passed"
to a surviving spouse. 100 This marital deduction is subject to
certain limitations, one of which disallows the deduction for a
spousal gift that is a "terminable interest."101 Internal Revenue Code § 2056(b)(3) provides an exception to this terminable
interest rule for gifts that require spousal survival for no more
than six months and death does not in fact occur. The problem
foreseen in this connection relates to hypothetical marital gifts
payable upon "distribution" or "final settlement" of the
decedent's estate "if' the spouse is then surviving. As the condition in these cases "is one which may occur either within the 6month .period or thereafter, the exception provided by section
2056(b)(3) will not apply."102
A similar problem arises when the marital gift is conditioned
upon the spouse surviving to the time of the gift's distribution
as opposed to the estate's settlement or distribution. The 1997
legislation adds a new constructional rule to the Virginia Code
providing that, in a case requiring survival to gift distribution, 103 the decedent's language will be construed to require
"that the spouse survive until the earlier of the date on which
the distribution occurs or the date six months after the date of
the death of the testator or decedent."104 Although this provision is designed to preserve the marital deduction, it could also
operate to the prejudice of the beneficiaries who would take if

99. The reservation of this right will cause the property subject to the power to
be included in the decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2038. Query: If the settlor is
serving as trustee, and thus could convert trust assets to tangible personal property,
would not this indirect reservation of power over the entire trust cause complete
inclusion in the gross estate?
100. LR.C. § 2056(a) (1997).
101. Id. § 2056(bX1) (1997).
102. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3(b) (1997).
103. It is unclear why the statute's presumption is limited to "gift distribution"
and thus is not applicable to "estate settlement" or "estate distribution" cases.
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-66.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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the condition is not construed out of existence by the statute
and the spouse actually dies more than six months after the
decedent but before the date the gift is actually distributed. To
help reduce such a possibility, the new legislation provides that
its constructional rule will not apply if the court, in a proceeding brought within twelve months of the decedent's death, finds
that the decedent intended a contrary result. 105
H. Estate Taxes-Interest and Penalties-Apportionment

Prior to 1997, the default rule regarding the ultimate burden
of estate taxes in Virginia provided for apportionment of the
"taxes" among the beneficiaries in proportion to their interest in
the decedent's estate.106 The first 1997 amendment makes this
default rule also applicable to any "interest and penalty" assessed in connection with such taxes. 107 The former default
rule also provided for taxes to be paid out of corpus, without
apportionment, in cases where a beneficiary received a temporary interest (in trust for life, term of years, etc.).108 The second 1997 amendment allows the fiduciary paying the tax in
such cases to allocate any interest109 thereon wholly or partially to the temporary interest, corpus or trust account, so long
as this determination is made "so as to fairly balance all interests in the property or fund. "110
I. Commissioners of Accounts-Medicaid-Fees

Section 26-17.4 of the Virginia Code, which was enacted as
part of a 1993 revision of the laws relating to the settlement of
fiduciary accounts, establishes the accounting requirements

105. See id. § 64.l-66.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997). The proceeding can be filed by the
decedent's personal representative or by "any affected beneficiary" (who might, in
some circumstances, not even become aware of the provision's existence during this
twelve-month period).
106. See id. § 64.1-161.1 (Rep. Vol. 1995).
107. Id. § 64.1-161.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
108. See id. § 64.1-161.1 (Rep. Vol. 1995).
109. Unlike the first amendment, the second amendment does not deal with the
allocation of any "penaltiesn imposed in connection with the tax, only with the "interest.n
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-161.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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applicable to guardians, curators, committees, trustees for exservice persons and their beneficiaries, and receivers for minor
married women. m The 1997 Session amendment to this section provides that a commissioner of accounts' fee for settling
the account of any such fiduciary acting on behalf of a Medicaid
recipient may not exceed twenty-five dollars. 112

J. Management of Institutional Funds-Definition
Prior to the 1997 Session, the definition of "institutional
fund" in the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds
Act113 excluded "a fund held for an institution by a trustee
which is not an institution."114 The 1997 amendment includes
such a fund if it "is held by the trustee as a component trust of
a community trust or foundation. "115
IV. 1997 LEGISLATION EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1998

Guardianship Reform. A long perceived need for the reform
of Virginia's adult guardianship laws116 culminated with the
1997 Session's passage of Senate Bill No. 408, a comprehensive
reform of both the personal and the property aspects of the
governing law. 117 Because of the number and the far-reaching
nature of the changes that have been made, this legislation has
a delayed effective date of January 1, 1998.118 The nature of

111. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see also J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 833, 83842 (1993) (discussing this revision).
112. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.4 (Repl. Vol. 1997). The same bill made a conforming amendment to section 26-24 dealing generally with fees of commissioners of
accounts. Id. § 26-24 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
113. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-268.1-.10 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
114. Id. § 55-268.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
115. Id. § 55-268.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
116. See Harriett H. Shivers, Guardianship Laws: Reform Efforts in Virginia, 26
U. RICH. L. REv. 325, 325-65 (1992) (discussing the need for reform of Virginia's
adult guardianship laws and the history of reform efforts to 1992).
117. Act of April 28, 1997, ch. 921, 1997 Va. Acts 2503 technically amended by
S.B. 1038, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997) (enacted as Act of April 12, 1997, ch.
801, 1997 Va. Acts 1973).
118. Act of April 28, 1997, ch. 921, 1997 Va. Acts 2536; Act of April 2, 1997, ch.
801, 1997 Va. Acts 2036.
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this survey and space limitations preclude any meaningful analysis of this extensive legislation in these materials.
V. 1997 LEGISLATION EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1998
In 1993, the Judicial Council of Virginia created a Standing
Committee on Commissioners of Accounts (the public officials
charged with the primary responsibility for overseeing fiduciary
administration in the Commonwealth), and gave it six charges.
Three of those charges were (i) "to promote uniformity of practice in the filing and auditing of accounts," (ii) "to provide uniform instructions to persons who qualify as fiduciaries," and
(iii) "to make a continuous review of the statutes relating to
fiduciaries."119 The Committee's first legislative response to
these charges resulted in the submission of eleven proposals to
the 1997 Session which, for purposes of convenience, were included in one omnibus bill.120 This legislation, which is noted
in the following paragraphs,121 has a delayed effective date of
July 1, 1998122 in order to give the Supreme Court of Virginia
sufficient time to prepare certain mandated probate forms and
for all affected parties to become familiar with the new forms
and other changes.
A

Uniform Probate Forms

Although the same basic fiduciary administration forms are
used in all Virginia jurisdictions, many of the forms used for
the same purpose differ in varying degree from one clerk's office

119. Letter from the Honorable Harry L. Carrico, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virginia to J. Rodney Johnson (Mar. 10, 1993) (on file with the author). The
other three charges were (i) "to improve the oversight by the courts of Commissioners
of Accounts," (ii) "to develop training programs and materials," and (iii) "to consider
the need for uniform fee schedules for Commissioners of Accounts." Id.
120. H.B. 2085, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997) (enacted as Act of April 2,
1997, ch. 842, 1997 Va. Acts 2185).
121. Two parts of this legislation relate to the commissioner of accounts vis-a-vis
deeds of trust used as security instruments and thus they are mentioned only in this
note. The first amends section 26-15 to define "date of sale" for fiduciary accounting
purposes, and the second amends section 55-59.4 to change the trustee's compensation
from five percent of gross proceeds to a "reasonable" commission. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-15 (Repl. Vol. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
122. Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 842, 1997 Va. Acts 2193.
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to another. The resulting plethora of same-purpose forms is a
hindrance to professional fiduciaries and attorneys who practice
in multiple jurisdictions; it means that some desirable information is not always available from the record, and its duplication
of effort in the preparation and printing of multiple forms is
wasteful. Thus, the new legislation provides for certain uniform
forms, and mandates their use.
(1) Fiduciary Qualification-Memorandum of Facts. The clerk
of court's need for a convenient way to obtain necessary information from a person seeking to qualify as a fiduciary has
resulted in the creation of various ad hoc forms, all of which
appear to be derived from a dated, but still authoritative, practice manual in wide circulation.123 New section 26-1.2 of the
Code calls for the Supreme Court of Virginia to develop uniform
fiduciary qualification forms, with instructions, and mandates
their use in all cases.124
(2) Inventory. Present law requires every "personal representative, guardian, curator or committee" to file an inventory
under oath with the commissioner of accounts disclosing (i)
personalty under supervision or control, (ii) realty with power of
sale, and (iii) other known realty. 125 Present law also provides
a permissive form that the fiduciary may use in making this
inventory.126 The present inventory statute, however, fails to
recognize that different considerations are sometimes applicable
to different fiduciaries, and the present permissive forms' statute, which focuses on personal representatives, doesn't serve the
complete needs of any fiduciary. As recast by the 1997 Session,
the inventory statute's oath requirement is eliminated and its
reporting requirement is divided into two parts, (i) one part
applying to personal representatives and curators,127 and (ii)
123. See BROKENBROUGH LAMB, VIRGINIA PROBATE PRACTICE (1957). Form one in
Judge Lamb's book, entitled "Memorandum of Counsel," is designed to obtain the necessary information for the clerk's qualification of an administrator on an intestate
estate. See id. at 1. Forms for all other fiduciary offices are found in other parts of
his book.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-1.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). In recognition of the increasing use of computer technology, the section also provides that "[i]n
lieu of any form, a computer-generated facsimile of the form may be used by the
person seeking to qualify." Id.
125. Id. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
126. Id. § 26-12.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
127. These fiduciaries are required to report (i) personalty under supervision and
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the other part applying to guardians of an estate, conservators,
and committees.128 And, paralleling the procedure adopted for
the qualification forms, the inventory form's statute calls for the
Supreme Court of Virginia to develop uniform inventory forms,
with instructions, and mandates their use in all cases. 129 Lastly, the inventory statute's present rule mandating a further
inventory of after-discovered property within four months is
replaced with a more flexible rule that permits the fiduciary to
(i) file an additional inventory showing only the after-discovered
assets, (ii) file an amended inventory showing all the assets of
the estate or, (iii) with the commissioners consent, show the
after-discovered property on fiduciary's next accounting. 130
(3) Fiduciary Accounting. The Virginia Code presently contains one general-purpose permissive form for "[a]ny accounting
by a fiduciary," 131 and one optional form for use by testamentary trustees. 132 These forms have not proven to be very helpful. Attorneys have access to better forms, and consumers, who
administer most estates without the assistance of an attorney,
typically are unaware of their existence. Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates that the consumer-fiduciary's failure to understand how to satisfy the accounting requirement is one of the

control, (ii) decedent's interest in any multiple party account, (iii) real estate with
power of sale, and (iv) other realty in decedent's estate, whether in or out of Virginia. See id. § 26-12(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
128. These fiduciaries are required to report: (i) ward's personalty under supervision and control; (ii) ward's realty; (iii) ward's legal or equitable ownership interest in
realty or personalty that will pass to another at ward's death, other than by succession from the ward; and (iv) any periodic payments of money to which the ward is
entitled. See id. § 26-12(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). Note: When this
law becomes effective, as a consequence of the reform of guardianship laws mentioned
in Part IV of this article, the term "guardian of an estate" will apply only to a
guardian of a minor, the term "conservator" will apply to the fiduciary responsible for
the property of an adult incapacitated person, and the term "committee" will apply
only to the fiduciary for an incarcerated person.
129. See id. § 26-12.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). In recognition of
the increasing use of computer technology, the section also permits the fiduciary to
file an inventory "on a computer-generated facsimile of the appropriate form." Id.
130. See id. § 26-12(D) (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). This section further provides that "[t]he filing must be made or the permission granted within four
months after the discovery of the assets." Id.
131. Id. § 26-36.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 842, 1997
Va. Acts 2193 (effective July 1, 1998).
132. See id. § 26-17.8 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 842,
1997 Va. Acts 2193 (effective July 1, 1998).
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commissioner of accounts' biggest problems. The 1997 legislation attempts to ameliorate these problems by mandating that
(i) the Supreme Court of Virginia develop appropriate fiduciary
accounting forms, with instructions concerning their use, and
(ii) clerks of court provide every fiduciary with the appropriate
form. 133 Unlike inventories, however, accountings can and
sometimes must be made in different formats in order ·to correctly report the fiduciary's activity and the status of the assets
under the :fiduciary's control. Therefore, the 1997 amendment
provides that a fiduciary may make an accounting on the appropriate supreme court form, on a computer-generated facsimile of that form, "or in any other clear format."134 Lastly, the
1997 amendment clarifies that, in cases of multiple fiduciaries,
each fiduciary must sign the accounting. 135

B. Fiduciary's Bond-Increase-Clerk's Authority
The court or its clerk appointing a fiduciary determines the
amount of that fiduciary's bond based upon an estimate, provided by the fiduciary, of the value of the property believed to be
coming under the fiduciary's control. Though made in good
faith, this estimate may prove to be less than the amount actually involved. Thus, section 26-2 requires the commissioner of
accounts to determine the sufficiency of the bond, based upon
the assets disclosed in the fiduciary's inventory or account, and
report the findings to the court;136 and section 26-3 authorizes
the court to increase the fiduciary's bond to a proper
amount. 137 The 1997 legislation requires that the sufficiency
report under section 26-2 be made to the clerk as well as the
court,138 and it amends section 26-3 to confer upon the clerk
the same authority the court possesses to increase the amount

133. See id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
134. Id.
135. See id. In this regard, the amendment further provides that "[a] statement in
a separate document attached to an account that a fiduciary has received, read and
agrees with the account shall, if signed by the fiduciary, be treated as a signature to
the account." Id.
136. Id. § 26-2 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
137. Id. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
138. See id. § 26-2 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
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of the· fiduciary's bond, except in those cases where the amount
of the bond was originally established by the court.139
C. Subpoena Duces Tecum-Commissioner's Power to Issue
Section 26-8.1 of the Virginia Code confers upon commissioners of accounts the power to issue subpoenas to require persons
to appear before them. 140 The 1997 legislation further confers
upon commissioners the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum
to require the production of documents before them.141 Following the rule presently applicable to appearance subpoenas, the
commissioner does not have the power to punish for contempt
when a subpoena duces tecum is not honored, but can only certify such fact to the court which may punish on the same basis
as if the court had issued the subpoena.142
D. Commissioner's Fees

The Virginia Code presently provides for the fees of commissioners of accounts to be set by reference to the fees allowed to
commissioners in chancery.143 The 1997 legislation provides for
the fees of commissioners of accounts to be set by the appointing court.144 Present law has been obsolete for some time and
the new language actually reflects the current practice.

E. Commissioner's Working Papers-Destruction
All inventories and accounts that are filed with, or made to,
the commissioner of accounts are, at some point in the settlement process, transmitted by the commissioner to the clerk's
office where they are duly recorded. In this context, a question
troubling commissioners around the state is how long should
they retain their working papers relevant to the transmitted

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
Id. § 26-8.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
See id. § 26-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
See id.
See id. § 26-24 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
See id. § 26-24 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
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matter. An informal survey disclosed a variety of practices
spanning the possible spectrum.
The 1997 legislation eliminates the uncertainty by authorizing commissioners to destroy all estate related papers remaining in their possession "when the matter has been closed with a
confirmed final accounting for more than one year."145 And, in
order to keep like matters together, the 1997 legislation also
adds to the section containing the new file destruction rule146
the present provision relating to the return of vouchers to a
fiduciary when the commissioner's report on an account is filed
with the court.147
·

F. Fiduciary Accounting Requirement-Enforcement
Present law contains (i) a general provision requiring every
court appointed fiduciary to account,148 and (ii) separate provisions dealing with the specific accounting requirements applicable to the various fiduciaries. 149 A companion code .provision,
section 26-18, requires the commissioner of accounts to make
semi-annual reports to the court identifying those fiduciaries
who are in default in their accounting responsibility, and states
the court's required action concerning these defaulting fiduciaries.150 The 1997 amendments to section 26-18 give the commissioner the option, in lieu of reporting to the court, to "proceed against each such fiduciary by summons and report to the
court as provided by § 26-13."151 This desirable change gives
the commissioner the power to proceed against a defaulting
fiduciary immediately instead of the fiduciary having a de facto
immunity until the time of the commissioner's next semi-annual
report. A further amendment to section 26-18 clarifies that its
remedies are available when a fiduciary fails "to make a com-

145. Id. § 26-37 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998).
146. See id.
147. See id. § 26-32 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
148. See id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
149. See id. §§ 26-17.3 to -17.7 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
150. Id. § 26-18 (RepL Vol. 1997).
·
151. Id. § 26-18 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). The referenced Virginia
Code section 26-13 sets forth the procedure used by the commissioner to enforce the
filing of inventories.
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plete and proper account,"152 as opposed to the present "to
make any such e:xhibit."153 The present "exhibit" language has
been interpreted by some as making the remedy of section 2618 unavailable if a fiduciary has made any form of account, no
matter how incomplete. The new "complete and proper" language is designed to guarantee the availability of a remedy under section 26-18 in such cases.
G. Fiduciary Investment Requirements

Present law provides that a fiduciary charged with the investment of funds who lends them at less than a six percent
annual rate without prior court approval has the burden of
establishing (i) an inability to obtain a six percent return on
good security after the exercise of due diligence, and (ii) the
reasonableness of the rate actually obtained under the circumstances and its fairness to the beneficiary.154 Since time has
shown that establishing a presumptive percentage return in a
changing economy is unwise, the 1997 legislation replaces the
six percent rule with a requirement that the fiduciary "invest in
accordance with the provisions of§§ 26-40.01, 26-40.1, 26-40.2,
26-44, 26-44.1, and 26-45.1"155
VI. 1995-97 JUDICIAL OPINIONS
A

Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust-Administrative Amendability

Grantor's irrevocable inter vivos trust in Little v. Ward 156
contained the usual language providing "Grantor does hereby
expressly relinquish all right, whether acting individually or in
conjunction with others, to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate

152. Id.
153. Id. § 26-18 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (effective until July 1, 1998).
154. See id. § 26-39 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
155. Id. § 26-39 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). The sections cited in the
quoted language identify Virginia's reconfigured "legal list" and its new "prudent
investor rule," both of which are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Suruey of
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. R.EV. 873, 890-91 (1992), and
other fiduciary investment statutes.
156. 250 Va. 3, 458 S.E.2d 586 (1995).
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this Agreement."157 The unusual feature of Grantor's trust was
the existence of a blank space following the name of the trustee
throughout the document, originally intended to be used for
naming a co-trustee and, consistently therewith, a third signature line and notarial certificate at the document's end. 158
More than ten years following the trust's creation, Grantor, who
"understood she had 'the ability to fill in that blank,"'159 attempted to make an oral appointment of a co-trustee.160 The
trial court's decision allowing the modification on the theory
that it was merely administrative and not substantive was
reversed by the Supreme Court of Virginia. 161 Noting that the
irrevocability "language is all encompassing, prohibitive of any
alteration or amendment of the agreement, substantive or
administrative,"162 the supreme court held that "once the trust
became operative, the blank spaces became surplusage and,
thereafter, should have been ignored."163

B. Fiduciary Accounting-Commissioner's Report-Due Process
The complainant in Law v. Law,164 a resident of Michigan
who served as the legal representative of two minors interested
in a Virginia decedent's estate, maintained that the "limited
notice afforded by posting (on the courthouse door) as provided
in Code § 26-27 denied Clayton Law's heirs the opportunity to
contest the report of the commissioner of accounts in violation
of the due process clause."165 The Supreme Court of Virginia,
however, did not reach this constitutional argument because,
although the statutory fifteen-day period for filing objections
had run prior to complainant's filing, the record showed that

157. Id. at 5, 458 S.E.2d at 587.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 6, 458 S.E.2d at 588.
160. See id. at 6 n.1, 458 S.E.2d at 588 n.1.
161. See id. at 9, 458 S.E.2d at 589.
162. Id. at 9, 458 S.E.2d at 590 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 9-10, 458 S.E.2d at 590.
164. No. 941673, (Va. June 23, 1995). The constitutional issue raised by the complainant in this case is advocated in J. Rodney Johnson, The Absence of Due Process
in Fiduciary Accounting: A Constitutional Concern, VA. BAR Ass'N J. Fall, 1997 at 1115.
165. Law, No. 941673, at 2.
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the trial court did in fact hear and reject complainant's substantive arguments. 166
C. Release of Expectancy in Decedent's Estate
The issue before the Supreme .Court of Virginia in Ware v.
Crowell 161 was "whether a written release of an expectancy
interest in an ancestor's estate bars the releasing party from
taking property under the terms of the ancestor's will."168 The
supreme court answered this issue of "first impression"169 in
the affirmative, thereby aligning Virginia with "[a]t least twenty-two of the twenty-five jurisdictions that have addressed the
issue."170

D. Joint Accounts-Closure-Survivorship Presumption
The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia in CraverFarrell v. Anderson171 was whether the statutory presumption
of survivorship between parties to a joint account in a financial
institution172 continues to apply to the funds from a joint account following their deposit in a new account when the name
of the party depositing all of the "joint" funds is not shown on
the new account at that party's request. Notwithstanding the
survivor's belief that the funds in the new account continued to
be the depositor's funds for the depositor's lifetime, and the
survivor's testimony that title was intended to pass at
166. See id.
167. 251 Va. 116, 465 S.E.2d 809 (1996).
168. Id. at 118, 465 S.E.2d at 810.
169. The Court distinguished this case from Headrick v. McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45
S.E. 804 (1903). "There, we held that covenants with an ancestor to relinquish an
interest in the ancestor's estate cannot affect application of the statutes governing
descent and distribution. . . . However, since Burle died testate, Headrick is inapplicable to the present case." Ware, 251 Va. at 120, 465 S.E.2d at 812. Query: If the
substance of these two cases is the same, is it good policy for their outcome to differ
based upon the fortuity of the ancestor dying testate or intestate?
170. Ware, 251 Va. at 119, 465 S.E.2d at 811.
171. 251 Va. 369, 467 S.E.2d 770 (1996).
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.5(A) (Rep!. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997). Surprisingly, it appears that neither party made any reference to Code § 6.1-125.15,
titled "Identification of joint accounts," which requires that financial institutions offering joint accounts obtain a signed declaration on the account card stating the parties'
actual intent regarding survivorship. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.15 (Rep!. Vol. 1993).
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depositor's death, the supreme court held that the trial court
erred in applying the joint account presumption of survivorship
to the funds after the joint account was closed.173

E. Intestate Succession-Illegitimacy-Exhumation
In Garrett v. Majied, 174 involving the claimed existence of a
illegitimate parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate
succession, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Virginia's
exhumation statute "does not authorize an exhumation order for
the purpose of establishing paternity."175 In response to this
case, the 1997 General Assembly amended the exhumation
statute to provide that the trial court may order disinterment
in such cases "for the conduct of scientifically reliable genetic
tests, including blood tests, to prove a biological relationship" if
the moving party presents substantial evidence that he will
prevail under§§ 64.1-5.1 and -5.2 of the Virginia Code.176
F. Inter Vivos Trust-Power of Appointment-Interpretation
Reversing the trial court's conclusion to the contrary, the
Supreme Court of Virginia, in Frazer v. Millington 177 concluded that certain language in Grantor's trust relating to the exercise of a special power of appointment was not ambiguous.176
G. Inter Vivos Trust-Beneficiary's Right to Copy of Entire
Document

Following the death of the grantor in Fletcher v. Fletcher,179

173. See Craver-Farrell, 251 Va. at 373, 467 S.E.2d at 772, (citing Bennet v. First
& Merchants Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987)).
174. 252 Va. 46, 471 S.E.2d 479 (1996).
175. Id. at 49, 471 S.E.2d at 480.
176. VA. CODE .ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). This legislation is discussed in
Part ill.B. of this article.
.
177. 252 Va. 195, 475 S.E.2d 811 (1996).
178. See id. at 199, 475 S.E.2d at 814. Although agreeing with the supreme court
regarding both the grantor's intent and the outcome in this case, one wonders if the
fact that two courts came to opposite conclusions concerning the proper interpretation
of the grantor's language doesn't suggest that an ambiguity really did exist.
179. 253 Va. 30, 480 S.E.2d 488 (1997).
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her inter vivos trust remained in effect but was divided into
various subtrusts, one of which was for the benefit of her son,
James, and his two children. Upon James' request for a copy of
the entire trust agreement, the trustees gave him only what
they claimed were the pages relevant to his interest. 180 Upon
James's suit to obtain all of the pages, the trustees advanced
various reasons why he was not so entitled, and they furnished
the trial court a complete copy of the trust agreement so it
could see that they had in fact shared all relevant pages with
James. 181 Affirming the trial court's decision that James was
entitled to a complete copy, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that the trustees "place too much emphasis upon the
duties of trustees while neglecting the rights of beneficiaries."182 Relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and
the works of Professors Scott183 and Bogert184 "in this case of
first impression in Virginia,"185 the supreme court also provided an excellent discussion of a trust beneficiary's right to information from the trustee. 186
H. Inter Vivos Trust-Time for Distribution

Grantor's inter vivos trust in Cooper v. Brodie 187 called for
post-death distribution among her beneficiaries following "the
payment or provision for the payment of ... [death] taxes."188
Grantor's estate made an election under I.R.C. § 6166A to pay
estate taxes on an installment basis which, a beneficiary
claimed, was a "provision for the payment" within the language
of Grantor's trust, thereby making the trust distributable. 189

180. See id. at 33, 480 S.E.2d at 490.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491.
183. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCO'IT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (4th ed. HIB7).
184. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (Rev. 2d ed.
1983).
185. Fl.etcher, 253 Va. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491.
186. In this connection, the court further noted that, as the record contained no
finding concerning the existence of an alleged request from Grantor to Trustees to not
disclose, "we express no opinion on what effect any directive of secrecy by the Grantor would have on the outcome of this case." Id. at 36, 480 S.E.2d at 492.
187. 253 Va. 38, 480 S.E.2d 101 (1997).
188. Id. at 41, 480 S.E.2d at 102-03.
189. Id. at 42, 480 S.E.2d at 103.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's acceptance of this argument because, notwithstanding the election,
the amount of the estate liability had not yet been determined
and "[t]hus, there was no way for [the trustee] to provide for
the payment of the tax."190 In addition, the supreme court (i)
upheld the trial court's disallowance of the trustee's claim for
an additional $500,000 as compensation, where the trustee had
earlier represented that total compensation as executor and
trustee would be $120,000 and had claimed that amount as a
deduction on the estate tax return,191 and (ii) reversed the trial court's refusal to allow the recovery all of the trustee's legal
fees from trust assets when the trustee had a good faith basis
for defending the suit. 192
I. Will Execution-Substantial Compliance
In Draper v. Pauley, 193 a notary public who was called to
Draper's hospital room wrote at the top of two otherwise blank
sheets of paper the following: "This is to verify that the signature below is the true signature of Irene Draper."194 Draper's
signature and the notary's attestation appeared after this
statement, and then followed Draper's purported will in the
handwriting of Pauley, a beneficiary, to whom Draper dictated
it. 195 "When Pauley finished writing, she read the document
back to Draper, who stated that the document was exactly as
she wanted it. Then Darlene Butler signed the document beside
[the notary's] name."196 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's admission of Draper's will to probate
because (i) Draper acknowledged the writing as her will in the
presence to two witnesses (Butler and Pauley), and (ii) the
required two witnesses (Butler and Pauley) subscribed in
Draper's presence because, under the principles of Robinson v.
Ward,1 97 Pauley's writing of her own name as a beneficiary in

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 43, 480 S.E.2d at 103.
See id. at 43, 480 S.E.2d at 104.
See id. at 44, 480 S.E.2d at 104.
253 Va. 78, 480 S.E.2d 495 (1997).

Id. at 79, 480 S.E.2d at 496.
See id. at 80, 480 S.E.2d at 496.
Id.
239 Va. 36, 387 S.E.2d 7358 (1990); see also J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing
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the text of Draper's will also served as Pauley's witnessing
signature to the will itself. 198

J. Disclaimer-Life Insurance Proceeds-Creditors' Rights
Lanasa u. Willey 199 was an action against an attorney's widow on a promissory note executed by the attorney and his wife
in connection with the attorney's misappropriation of client
funds. In that case, where the attorney committed suicide several week's after the note's execution, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the co-signing widow was liable for the full
amount of the note, $274,495.22, plus interest.200 The later,
connected case of Abbott u. Willey, 201 involves the successful
plaintiffs in the.first case who claim that the widow's purported
disclaimer of insurance proceeds of $350,845.92, plus interest,
due her on account of her husband's death, was a fraudulent
conveyance. The supreme court, however, concluded that the
widow had an absolute statutory right to make such a disclaimer of the proceeds, and that "Code § 64.1-193 makes it perfectly
clear that the disclaimer relates back 'for all purposes' to the
effective date of the life insurance policy."202 Thus, because of
the widow's disclaimer, the proceeds were payable to the
attorney's secondary beneficiaries (the children) as if the widow
had died before the insurance policy's effective date. 203
A pregnant sentence in the Court's opinion reads as follows:
"Kathleen Willey's children received the death benefits and
used those funds to support their mother."204 The use of these
funds for the disclaimant's support invites a claim of a possible
agreement to this effect prior to Kathleen's disclaimer. If such
an antecedent agreement did exist, then Kathleen was statuto-

with Wills' Act Formalities for Substantively Valid Wills, 18 VA. BAR Ass'N J. Winter,
1992, at 10.
198. See Draper, 253 Va. at 81, 480 S.E.2d at 496-97.
199. 251 Va. 231, 467 S.E.2d 786 (1996).
200. See id. at 234, 467 S.E.2d at 787.
201. 253 Va. 88, 479 S.E.2d 528 (1997).
202. Id. at 91, 479 S.E.2d at 530.
203. See id. at 92, 479 S.E.2d at 530.
204. Id. at 90, 479 S.E.2d at 529.
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rily barred from making a disclaimer.205 This issue is not discussed in the supreme court's opinion.
K

Inter Vivos Gift-Capacity-Evidence

The day before his remarriage, seventy-seven year old Father
executed a deed of gift conveying certain real estate to Daughter and himself as joint tenants with survivorship.206 Ten
years later, Father sought to set this deed aside on the ground
that, on the date of the deed's purported execution, "he was 'infirm and of enfeebled mind [and] ignorant of the meaning of
the Deed.'"2°7 Following a lengthy review of the facts, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's decision in
Father's favor, emphasizing that in capacity cases "'the testimony of witnesses who were present when the instrument was executed is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of those
witnesses not present.'"208

VII.

CONCLUSION

The increased volume of estate-related legislation noted in
the 1995 review has continued unabated through the past two
sessions. The Virginia Bar Association, always a significant
source for the suggestion of estate-related legislation, was
joined in this regard by the Standing Committee on Commis205. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see also Niklason v. Ramsey,
233 Va. 161, 353 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
206. See Hill v. Brooks, 253 Va. 168, 170, 482 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1997).
207. Id. at 170, 482 S.E.2d at 817-18. In addition, Father alleged that '"if he did
in fact sign the ... instrument,' [Daughter] 'fraudulently procured his signature."' Id.
at 170, 482 S.E.2d at 818.
208. Id. at 175, 482 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting Brown v. Resort Deva., 238 Va. 527,
529, 385 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1989) (emphasis added).
Father also argued that his unilateral mistake regarding his "understanding of
the deed of gifl;'s [e]ffect ... makes the deed voidable." Id. at 178, 482 S.E.2d at
823. The supreme court dismissed this argument, relying on precedent that "a unilateral mistake may provide a ground of relief only when 'there is a mistake on the
part of • . . one party, . . . but it is accompanied by 'misrepresentation and fraud by
the other."' Id., (quoting Ward v. Ward, 239 Va. 1, 5, 387 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1990)). Although the requested cancellation of the deed was unavailable in this case, the Restatement does recognize the possibility of reformation of a deed solely on the basis
of unilateral mistake. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 34.7 cmt. d (1992).
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sioners of Accounts in 1997,209 and it appears that this latter
group may be expected to continue in these efforts. As these
two groups develop a working relationship with each other, the
Commonwealth can expect to see a continued increase in the
quality of their submissions to the General Assembly.

209. See supra Part V (discussing the legislation suggested by the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts).

